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Limits of Dodd-Frank’s Rating  
Agency Reform 
Claire A. Hill 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of rating agency reform has not been inspiring.  
Until recently, it seemed stuck in an ever-repeating cycle of 
futility.  A crisis would spur calls for reform, hearings would be 
conducted, the SEC would issue proposals and requests for 
comments, and ultimately, nothing would happen—until the next 
crisis, when the cycle would begin again.  The Enron debacle, in 
which the rating agencies rated Enron’s debt investment grade 
until four days before Enron declared bankruptcy,1 did spur some 
action, including federal legislation and SEC regulations.2  
Whatever else may be said about the Enron-spurred action, it 
failed to prevent rating agencies from rating low-quality 
securities as AAA.  This misrating was an important cause of the 
recent financial crisis.3 
In response to the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)4 was 
passed.  Dodd-Frank includes some reforms to the rating agency 
regulatory regime.  In this article, I argue that while Dodd-
Frank’s rating agency reforms are not bad, they also are not 
particularly good.  They do not sufficiently address the core 
reasons why rating agencies gave such inflated ratings to 
subprime securities or why the agencies so grievously misrated 
 
 Professor, Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, and Director, Institute for 
Law & Rationality, University of Minnesota.  Thanks to participants at the Chapman 
University School of Law symposium, “From Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of 
Financial Regulation.” 
 1 See Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before S. 
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Enron Hearings] (statement of 
Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid= 
f:79888.pdf. 
 2 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 3 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxv (2011), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf. 
 4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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other instruments, including Enron debt and debt involved in the 
Asian flu.  I then explain the reasons for this conclusion, and 
make some suggestions for better rating agency reform.  
I.  WHY HAVE THE RATING AGENCIES FAILED?  
A. Two (Extreme?) Possibilities 
Rating agencies have often been right in their ratings.  
Sometimes, however, they have been wrong, even spectacularly 
wrong.  Why have they sometimes been so wrong?  Consider the 
following two possibilities.  The first is that the rating agencies 
are less than cutting-edge in their capabilities.  Because of their 
privileged positions—thanks to government favoritism and 
market norms effectively requiring their use, something I will 
explain more in Part II—they have not had to fear large losses of 
market share.  Because credit ratings agencies have not needed 
to compete vigorously on quality, they have not sought to excel; 
instead (in the more charitable version of this explanation) they 
have simply maintained some minimal level of competence.  
Rating agencies therefore have not needed to be very 
sophisticated in their financial analyses; they also have not 
needed to be particularly good at ferreting out fraud.5 
The second possibility as to why rating agencies have been so 
wrong at times is that they are corrupt.  Because the agencies 
are paid by the issuers and the issuers can threaten to take their 
business elsewhere if they cannot get high ratings, the rating 
agencies have let themselves be bribed into giving high ratings 
even when such ratings are not warranted.6 
Many rating agency critics writing before the recent 
financial crisis seemed to believe the first explanation.  Critics 
writing since the crisis seem to believe the second. 
i.  Before the Recent Financial Crisis 
Notable rating agency fiascos before 2008 include: Enron 
(corporation’s extensive use of financial “techniques” that created 
a wholly false financial appearance), Orange County (ill-advised 
bets on interest rates using complex derivatives by county 
Treasurer Robert Citron, leading to bankruptcy), the Asian Flu 
(a cascade of recessions in the region leading to massive 
downgrading), Washington Public Power Supply System 
(“WPPSS,” pronounced “Whoops”) (cost overruns and other 
 
 5 See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 78–81 
(2004) [hereinafter Hill, Regulating]. 
 6 See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime 
Securities, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 593–96 (2010) [hereinafter Hill, Bad Job]. 
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complicating factors led to default on bonds originally rated 
AAA),7 and National Century Financial Enterprises (bankruptcy 
after lying executives “deceive[d] investors and rating agencies 
about the financial health of NCFE and how investors’ money 
would be used”)8. 
Following are some criticisms of the rating agencies in these 
debacles attributing the bad rating agency performance to 
incompetence: 
As to Enron: Joseph Lieberman, then-Chairman of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, said: 
[T]he credit rating agencies were dismally lax in their coverage of 
Enron.  They didn’t ask probing questions and generally accepted at 
face value whatever Enron officials chose to tell them.  And while they 
claim to rely primarily on public filings with the SEC, analysts from 
Standard and Poor’s not only did not read Enron’s proxy statement, 
they didn’t even know what information they might contain.9 
Approximately one year after Enron, one commentator said: 
“[t]he rating agencies display the classic characteristics of an 
entrenched cartel . . . [t]hey’re lazy, unresponsive, and ultimately 
unhelpful.  They tend to play catch-up, downgrading ratings only 
after financial weaknesses are revealed or ferreted out by more 
enterprising researchers.”10 
As to Orange County, Betsy Dotson, an assistant director 
with the Government Finance Officers Association said: “[m]any 
of our members have called us wondering where the rating 
agencies were.  It’s a logical question . . . .  Some of these losses 
may have been avoided if the rating agencies had spotted 
problems earlier.”11  Christopher Cox, then a U.S. Representative 
(and later SEC Commissioner), said: “[h]ow is it that the rating 
agencies, the SEC, the entire market, was unable to learn about 
what [Robert ] Citron was doing?”12   
 
 7 See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After Enron?, 4 
J. BUS. TECH. L. 283, 291–92 (2009).   
 8 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Former National Century 
Financial Enterprises CEO Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison, Co-Owner Sentenced to 25 
Years in Prison for Conspiracy, Fraud and Money Laundering (Mar. 27, 2009), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/cincinnati/press-releases/2009/ci032709.htm; see also id. 
 9 Press Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman, Financial Oversight of Enron: 
The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs, COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS (Oct. 7, 2002), 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_archive/100702press.htm. 
 10 Daniel Gross, Bust Up the Ratings Cartel, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2002, 1:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2075959/. 
 11 Debora Vrana, Bond Investors Question Abilities of Credit-Rating Services in 
Debacle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-
08/business/fi-6631_1_orange-county-s-bankruptcy. 
 12 Gebe Martinez, Cox Wonders How Citron Got Past SEC, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, 
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As to the Asian flu, one common critique was that the rating 
agencies were caught unaware (or, as one article memorably 
said, “with their pants down.”)13  In the same vein is this critique 
of the rating agencies made in the aftermath of the WPPSS 
debacle: Moody’s Investors Service “simply did not recognize that 
credit analysis in this new situation required looking upstream to 
the impact on the venture’s sponsors.”14 
ii.  Since the Financial Crisis Began 
A stark contrast exists between the foregoing picture of 
rating agencies as hapless dunces and the picture painted of 
their behavior rating subprime mortgage securities, the 
securities whose decline in value precipitated the financial crisis.  
A critical fact is that most rating agencies, including Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings (sometimes colloquially 
known as the “Big Three”), are paid by the issuers whose 
securities they rate, creating a conflict of interest.15  A search on 
Google.com for “rating agency conflict of interest” on April 11, 
2011 yielded approximately 688,000 hits.16  Paul Krugman 
apparently subscribes to this view.  He wrote a column entitled 
“Berating The Raters” in which he says, “[c]learly the rating 
agencies skewed their assessments to please their clients.”17  
Joseph Stiglitz also emphasizes rating agency conflicts.  Stiglitz 
noted that  
[t]he incentive structure of the rating agencies also proved perverse.  
Agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are paid by the very 
people they are supposed to grade.  As a result, they’ve had every 
reason to give companies high ratings, in a financial version of what 
college professors know as grade inflation.18 
 
at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-22/local/me-34793_1_orange-
county-investment.   
 13 Rating Agencies Caught With Their Pants Down, EUROMONEY, Jan. 15, 1998, at 
51; see also G. Ferri, L.-G. Liu & J. E. Stiglitz, The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: 
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis, 28 ECON. NOTES 335, 337 (1999) (“Credit rating 
agencies were caught by surprise by the East Asian crisis.”). 
 14 Willard T. Carleton, Brian Dragun & Victoria Lazear, The WPPSS Mess, or 
“What’s in a Bond Rating?”: A Case Study, 2 INT’L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 14 (1993). 
 15 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 44, 50.  Historically, some agencies were 
paid by their subscribers, but that business model became more difficult when copying 
machines became readily available. Id. 
 16 Search query of “rating agency conflict of interest,” GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); see also Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 
593 (finding 274,000 hits as of 2010). 
 17 Paul Krugman, Berating the Raters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A23, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/opinion/26krugman.html?dbk. 
 18 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009, at 48, 51. 
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Former employees of rating agencies, especially Moody’s, 
have given powerful testimony blaming the misratings involved 
in the financial crisis on this conflict of interest.  One Moody’s 
employee, Eric Kolchinsky, testified that  
[i]n my opinion, the cause of the financial crisis lies primarily with the 
misaligned incentives in the financial system.  Individuals across the 
financial food chain, from the mortgage broker to the CDO banker, 
were compensated based on quantity rather than quality.  The 
situation was no different at the rating agencies.19 
B. The (Obvious) Third Possibility 
The foregoing indicates an interesting, and largely 
unnoticed, shift in the reasons given by commentators as to why 
rating agencies have sometimes spectacularly misrated.  Are 
rating agencies dunces, corrupt, or both?  I have argued 
elsewhere that the agencies are neither, although both their 
quality and independence need significant improvement.  As to 
the former, I argued that the agencies were not cutting-edge, 
given that they didn’t have to compete vigorously for business.20  
I have disputed, though, the argument that their ratings provide 
no information whatsoever—that the agencies are complete 
dunces.21  Government favoritism and established market 
practices allowed rating agencies to be slackers (and/or dunces), 
but only up to a point.  Past that point, markets, and probably 
government, would have intervened. 
I have also argued that the agencies were generally not 
wholly self-consciously corrupt.  Rather, they engaged in 
considerable self-deception and reckless, if not willful, blindness, 
similar to the self-deception practiced at many investment banks 
and law firms.22  Moreover, the agencies are clearly capable of 
not being corrupted when they are being paid by issuers; their 
ratings for plain-vanilla debt, for which they are also paid by the 
issuers, are not generally considered to be compromised.23  But 
there are some clear indications of corruption during the recent 
financial crisis.  A few former rating agency employees have 
described the single-minded pursuit of market share at the 
 
 19 Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 
111th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Eric Kolchinsky, former Team Managing Director, 
Moody’s Investors Service), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg57321/pdf/CHRG-111shrg57321.pdf. 
 20 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 72–81; Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 600. 
 21 Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 72. 
 22 See Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It 
Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 340–42 (2010). 
 23 See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 595. 
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expense of credit quality.24  One notorious incident discussed 
below concerns Moody’s’ discovery that it had mistakenly applied 
its rating model so as to give too high a rating to a particular 
type of instrument.25  Moody’s’ response was to change the model 
so that the instruments would continue to have a high rating.26 
What accounts for the increasing perception and, to some 
extent, reality, of greater corruption in rating agencies post-
Enron?  Very simply, that there was a much higher payoff to 
being corrupt (or self-deceiving, or recklessly or willfully blind) 
than had previously been the case, and a higher cost to not being 
so.  This is because rating agencies began to compete with one 
another for business.  Previously, the government favoritism and 
market norms had created what was sometimes called a “partner 
monopoly” with Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s as the partners.27  
Another agency, Fitch, gradually became an acceptable 
alternative.28  Thus, an issuer’s threat to take its business 
elsewhere became a credible one.   
Moreover, the amount of business at issue is near-infinite.  
The ratings business originally involved rating debt securities for 
companies that wanted to raise money and found it worthwhile 
to do so.  A “natural” and fairly low limit of such issuances thus 
exists.  By contrast, structured finance securities are made up of 
other instruments; structuring the securities is itself a business 
entered into for profit.  There is thus incentive and ability to 
structure more such instruments.  The raw materials—the 
underlying instruments—originally were needed.  But as 
structuring technology and investor appetites got more 
sophisticated, the need for raw materials ceased to be much of a 
constraint.  Securitization securities could be crafted out of other 
securitization securities (“collateralized debt obligations cubed,” 
or CDO3s) and they could be “synthetics,” comprised of bets 
tracking the performance of “real” instruments.  Thus, the only 
“natural” limit to the structure of securities was investors’ 
appetites, and investors proved voracious indeed. 
 
 24 Krugman, supra note 17, at A23; Statement and Testimony by Eric Kolchinsky 
Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM. 1–3  
(June 2, 2010), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0602-
Kolchinsky.pdf; Testimony of Mark Froeba Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM. 3–4 (June 2, 2010), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0602-Froeba.pdf [hereinafter 
Froeba Statement]. 
 25 Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 591. 
 26 See id. at 593. 
 27 See infra Part II. 
 28 Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 587 n.4 & 590 n.15. 
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II.  SOME INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Some institutional background is in order.  Who are these 
rating agencies that benefitted from government favoritism, and 
that are favored by markets?  Why are there so few of them?  
What form did the government favoritism take?  What effect did 
the reforms adopted in response to the Enron debacle have?  
Below, I briefly discuss some answers to these questions. 
The ratings agencies at issue, the Big Three, are Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and, to a lesser extent, Fitch 
Ratings.  Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s both date back to the 
early 1900s.29  They have had the vast bulk of the rating agency 
market for a very long time.30  Fitch has existed for a 
considerable length of time as well, and is an amalgam of several 
smaller rating agencies.31  Over the years, Fitch has increased its 
prominence, especially in the area of structured finance 
securities, the type of securities involved in the financial crisis.32  
Markets have expected issuers to get ratings for their securities 
from both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s (or, in the case of some 
structured finance securities, one rating from Moody’s or 
Standard & Poor’s and the other from Fitch); this expectation 
apparently may translate into lower buyer valuations for 
securities issued without their ratings.33 
Government favoritism is shorthand for two things that, 
especially in tandem, have contributed to the continuing 
dominance of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and more recently, 
Fitch.  One is that since 1931, the government has required or 
encouraged certain types of investors to prefer financial 
instruments that rating agencies rate highly.34  The other is that 
in 1975, the SEC began designating particular rating agencies as 
“Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,” or 
“NRSROs.”35  The government’s requirement or encouragement 
that some investors buy highly rated instruments became a 
requirement or encouragement that such investors buy 
instruments rated highly by an NRSRO.36  There were no set 
procedures to become an NRSRO.37  Very few agencies were 
 
 29 Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 46–47. 
 30 Id. at 47. 
 31 Id. at 46–47. 
 32 See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 587 n.4 & 590 n.15. 
 33 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 47 n.17 and accompanying text.  For more on 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and the two-ratings norm, see id. at 59–62.  Despite the two-
ratings norm, there are some areas in which the agencies did compete. See id. at 63. 
 34 See id. at 53. 
 35 Id. at 53–54. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 54. 
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accepted; the SEC noted that not many applied.38  Prominent 
among those accepted were Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Fitch.39 
Certainly, the process to obtain NRSRO designation was 
opaque at best.  One applicant, LACE Financial, noted that it 
was only contacted twice by the SEC: once to say its application 
had been received, and again, eight years later, to say the 
application had been denied.40  Another disappointed applicant, 
Egan-Jones, reported being told by the SEC that the SEC did not 
want to reveal the criteria for becoming an NRSRO, lest the 
applicant find a way to meet them.41 
Why do so few rating agencies have the vast bulk of the 
market?  Many blame the government and the NRSRO 
designation process for this state of affairs.42  I have argued 
elsewhere that the dynamic is more complicated.43  It is not as 
though the only agencies receiving the NRSRO designation were 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch.  Issuers could have used 
other NRSROs, but they typically did not.  Moreover, even when 
regulations only required the use of one agency, issuers might 
use two.44  A newspaper article written in 2004 noted that 
“[i]nvestors expect ratings from Moody’s and S&P, each of which 
controls about 40 percent of the market.”45  The article quoted 
Dessa Bokides, a former Wall Street banker as saying, “[y]ou 
basically have to go to Moody’s and S&P . . . .  The market doesn’t 
accept it if you don’t go to both of them.”46  Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s were the market anointed raters; Fitch made some 
inroads, especially in structured finance.  Nobody had both the 
will and the way to change this state of affairs.  But why two, 
and why these two?  Why was Fitch (and not one or more other 
agencies) able to make inroads when it did?  Nobody has a good 
answer to these questions, but it is clear that the norms at issue 
are sticky indeed. 
One reason why the rating agency industry is as 
concentrated as it is may be the difficulty with business 
strategies that would-be competitors might use.  Competing on 
 
 38 Id. at 54 n.60. 
 39 Id. at 59. 
 40 Id. at 55 n.61. 
 41 Id. at 54–55. 
 42 Id. at 62. 
 43 Id. at 59–64. 
 44 Id. at 66. 
 45 Alec Klein, Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets: Firms’ Influence Has Grown 
Along With World’s Reliance on Bonds, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A18, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5573-2004Nov22.html. 
 46 Id. 
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price is not apt to lure issuers; after all, the ones making the 
decisions are not bearing the costs themselves.  Any benefits 
issuers might enjoy from saving their companies money would be 
significantly outweighed by the reputational and financial costs 
their companies would bear if an issuance were not well-accepted 
by the markets.  Competing on laxity is the more obvious 
strategy, but it is self-defeating if done too nakedly; the new 
agency cannot be seen by markets to be easily bribed.  Thus, the 
rating agency needs some credible reason for its apparent laxity.  
The obvious reason that springs to mind is greater “expertise.”  
This is by some accounts precisely what Fitch did to become the 
third ranked agency, especially in structured finance.47  However, 
Fitch still had to fight perceptions that it was more lax than 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and it developed and carried out 
a strategy to do so.48 
So, it is perhaps not surprising that the rating agency 
industry has been concentrated, with very little competition.  The 
concentration had its costs, but it may also have had an 
important benefit.  As an article on WPPSS notes:  
[t]hese alumni [of the rating agencies who claim that there were 
insiders who wanted to downgrade WPPSS] are quick to allege a 
reason for the rating agencies’ restraint: they are rating their 
clients . . . .  Whoops, for example, has paid the two agencies more 
than $400,000 over the past ten years.  But since marketing a big 
bond issue without agency ratings would be unthinkable, it’s not clear 
that paying even substantial fees can buy issuers the upper hand.49 
Indeed, one important issue flagged in the Enron debacle 
was the extent to which the accounting firm Arthur Andersen felt 
it had to do its client’s bidding to keep the client, and was willing 
to do things that were arguably dishonest as a means to that 
end.50  When rating agencies misrated Enron’s securities, it was 
not because they were trying to keep Enron’s business by helping 
Enron create a false financial appearance.  Rather, the picture 
painted at the time was that the rating agencies were not canny 
chicanerers- they were clueless.  As a rating agency veteran was 
quoted in The Economist in 2003 as saying, “[w]e may be 
incompetent . . . but we’re not dishonest.”51 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 63–64. 
 49 Peter Brimelow, Shock Waves from Whoops Roll East, FORTUNE, July 25, 1983, at 
46–47. 
 50 Daniel Kadlec, Enron: Who’s Accountable?, TIME (Jan. 13, 2002), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,193520,00.html; see also Hill, 
Regulating, supra note 5, at 91. 
 51 Exclusion Zone, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 65.  That rating agencies were 
completely non-conflicted surely overstates the case; still, they were far less conflicted 
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That was then.  What about now?  The Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 requires the SEC to award NRSRO 
designations for applicants who meet specified criteria.52  The Act 
also requires increased disclosure and oversight.53  The Act did 
not prevent rating agencies from disastrously misrating 
subprime mortgage securities.  It has led to the designation of 
more NRSROs, including LACE Financial and Egan-Jones.54  By 
the time the Act was passed, Fitch was becoming a more 
plausible second (that is, additional) rater than it previously had 
been, especially in the structured finance arena.55  Issuers began 
to play agencies against each other, now being able to threaten 
credibly (unlike when there had been a partner monopoly 
consisting of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) that they might 
take their business elsewhere.  Might the two developments be 
linked?  It seems possible, although it also seems possible that 
Fitch, having marketed itself as a particular expert in structured 
finance simply succeeded in doing what it had set out to do.56  
Whatever the cause, the effect is clear and disastrous.  Former 
Moody’s employee Mark Froeba described the shift in culture at 
Moody’s.  According to Froeba, a culture of integrity was replaced 
 
than Arthur Andersen, and certainly, less than they later became once the norm of 
obtaining both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings eroded for subprime securities, and 
issuers could play both of these agencies off against each other and Fitch. 
 52 Credit Agency Rating Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327, 
1329–38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  An impetus for the 2006 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was apparently lobbying by the “small but vocal” 
agency Egan-Jones. HERWIG LANGOHR & PATRICIA LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND 
THEIR CREDIT RATINGS 403 (2008). 
 53 Credit Agency Rating Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327, 
1329–38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 54 See Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
nrsro.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).  Interestingly, in August of 2010, LACE Financial, 
was acquired by Julius Kroll, known as a corporate “sleuth.” See Aaron Lucchetti  
& Jeannette Neumann, Kroll Gets A License To Shoot (Bonds), WALL ST. J.,  
Aug. 31, 2010, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704323704575462040422537232.html.  Given that one reason 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s executives gave for not being able to do a better job rating 
Enron’s debt is that they are not experts at looking for fraud, perhaps Kroll can craft a 
market niche in doing precisely that. See Enron Hearings, supra note 1, at 7–9.  Another 
newly designated NRSRO, Realpoint, was bought in May 2010 by Morningstar, a “leading 
provider of independent investment research.” See Morningstar, Inc.  
Completes Acquisition of Realpoint, LLC, MORNINGSTAR (May 3, 2010), 
http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/asp/subject.aspx?filter=PR4498&xmlfile=174.xml.  It 
should be noted that over the years, before the 2006 Act effectively required the SEC to 
designate more NRSROs, the SEC had designated agencies other than Moody’s, Standard 
& Poor’s, and Fitch, but those three agencies ended up buying the other designees. See 
Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 54. 
 55 See Fitch Releases U.S. Structured Finance Rating Comparability Study,  
BUS. WIRE (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060324005359/en/ 
Fitch-Releases-U.S.-Structured-Finance-Rating-Comparability. 
 56 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 63–64. 
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by a culture that single-mindedly pursued market share.57  
Inaccurate ratings were a foreseeable result.  In testimony before 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Froeba stated: 
I have tried to show that Moody’s managers deliberately engineered a 
change to its culture intended to ensure that rating analysis never 
jeopardized market share and revenue.  They accomplished this both 
by rewarding those who collaborated and punishing those who 
resisted.  In addition to intimidating analysts who did not embrace 
the new values, they also emboldened bankers to resist Moody’s 
analysts if doing so was good for Moody’s business.  Finally, I have 
tried to provide you with an example of the extent to which the new 
culture corrupted the rating process.  The adjusted European CLO 
Rating Factor Table appears to have been adopted for the sole purpose 
of preserving Moody’s European CLO market share despite the fact 
that it might have resulted in Moody’s assigning ratings that were 
wrong by as much as one and a half to two notches.58 
III.  DODD-FRANK AND THE GOALS OF RATING AGENCY REFORM: 
RETURNING TO THE STORIES OF DUNCES AND CORRUPTION 
Dodd-Frank’s rating agency reform was enacted in response 
to the rating agencies’ disastrous misrating of subprime 
securities.59  The reform has two important goals.60  One is to 
decrease reliance on ratings.61  Notwithstanding what is often 
said, the problem is not simply that the rating agencies’ ratings 
were too high.  Rather, it is that people invested on the strength 
of those ratings.  We would not need to care what rating agencies 
did (or how badly they rated) if nobody listened to them.  The 
other goal is to improve the quality of ratings.62  The drafters of 
Dodd-Frank presumably recognized that people will continue to 
be influenced by the agencies, at least in the short- to moderate-
term, no matter what the government does.  If rating agencies 
will be influential for some time to come, it behooves government 
to make them better if at all possible. 
How does Dodd-Frank try to achieve these aims?  As to the 
first aim, elimination of reliance on the agencies, it mandates the 
elimination of references in statutes and regulations to 
NRSROs.63  Something else is to replace these references.64  The 
 
 57 Froeba Statement, supra note 24, at 4–5. 
 58 Id. at 19. 
 59 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010). 
 60 See, e.g., §§ 931–939A. 
 61 See § 939A. 
 62 See § 932 (requiring that, for example, NSRSOs establish internal controls over 
processes for determining credit ratings). 
 63 See § 939. 
 64 Id. 
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rationale behind the new law is simple and unassailable.  The 
government has many reasons to care about the quality of 
financial instruments and firms that hold them; it therefore 
needs a measure of quality.  It has used ratings, but they proved 
spectacularly unreliable.  The problem is that there is no ready 
alternative.  Moreover, the market norms of using ratings from 
rating agencies—indeed, particular rating agencies—will not 
disappear even if the statutory and regulatory references are 
removed.  Market practices are sticky, and market actors have 
strong incentives to abide by them.  Even now, after Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch have done so badly, and when other 
rating agencies are NRSROs, the Big Three are still highly 
influential.  As the title of an article published when the 
agencies’ misratings should have been fresh in investors’ minds 
indicates, In Rating Agencies, Investors Still Trust.65  All this 
suggests that at least in the short term and perhaps for the 
moderate term as well, reliance on NRSRO ratings and in 
particular, the Big Three’s ratings, will continue.  
As to the second aim, improving the quality of ratings, Dodd-
Frank has a multifaceted approach. 
For rating agencies, it provides for: 
(1) expanded procedures to deal with conflicts of interest66 
(2) more independence in their corporate governance67 
(3) greater internal controls68 
(4) more expansive and accessible disclosure of ratings and 
the basis for ratings69 
(5) increased accountability and liability70 
(6) a duty to blow the whistle on lawbreaking71 
Dodd-Frank also provides for more SEC oversight and 
monitoring of rating agencies.72 
 
 65 David Gillen, In Rating Agencies Investors Still Trust, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,  
2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/economy/ 
05place.html?dlbk. 
 66 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–84 (2010). 
 67 In this regard, section 932(t) requires that at least one half, but not fewer than 
two, of an NRSRO’s board of directors be independent of the NSRSO, including a 
definition of independence. 
 68 § 932(a)(2)(B)(3). 
 69 § 932. 
 70 §§ 932(a)(1), (2), (3); § 933; § 939G. 
 71 § 934. 
 72 § 932. 
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Will Dodd-Frank succeed in improving rating agency 
quality?  To appraise its prospects for doing so, let us consider 
again why rating agencies have grossly misrated.  I argued above 
that while some corruption existed, there was also a client-
oriented perspective that many have (in my view, mistakenly) 
characterized as corruption.  That perspective was borne of a 
broader lack of a competitive edge.  A true competitive edge 
would have kept agencies more receptive to receiving 
disconfirming evidence—evidence that many instruments for 
which their clients sought high ratings were really junk. 
Insofar as we think rating agencies are corrupt, or somewhat 
so, most of the Dodd-Frank reforms listed above may actually do 
a better job perfecting concealment than improving quality.  
Dodd-Frank does not ask rating agencies to guarantee results, 
only processes.73  Many skilled and well-meaning professionals 
are in the business of helping companies document that they are 
using appropriate processes.  It may be harder to do so if the 
companies are in fact corrupt than if they are not, but it is 
presumably not impossible.  If a corrupt company is trying to 
hide its corruption, it may be able to do so even from prying eyes 
of bureaucrats and litigants.  And if a company has convinced 
itself that it is behaving appropriately, there is even less to hide.  
Moreover, while the corrupt agency will be better at hiding what 
it does, the more honest yet more incompetent agency may fool 
bureaucrats too; bureaucrats’ monitoring is scarcely cutting-edge, 
and may catch only egregious errors.  The truly incompetent 
agency may be caught: it may also be incompetent in hiding its 
non-compliance with regulatory requirements.  But by the time a 
lawsuit is initiated, significant losses may already have been 
suffered. 
But what about the expanded procedures to deal with 
conflicts of interest and the increased role of independent board 
members?  Here, again, there are several reasons to be wary.  
These types of approaches have been used before for 
corporations, without significant positive effect.  Certainly, 
increased independence on corporate boards has scarcely been a 
panacea;74 the type of independence that is needed is 
independent-mindedness, not independence as it is formally 
 
 73 Some commentators have proposed that agencies should get financial rewards for 
accurate ratings and financial punishments for inaccurate ratings.  In my view, such 
proposals have insurmountable difficulties. See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 606 n.58 
and accompanying text. 
 74 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between 
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999). 
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defined.75  Whether a rating agency is (mostly or somewhat) 
corrupt, less than cutting-edge, or both, it will certainly be able 
and inclined to use processes that pass muster given the level of 
scrutiny even a highly technically sophisticated board member is 
apt to use.  It seems unlikely that a highly corrupt agency will be 
unable to conceal its improprieties.  It also seems unlikely that 
an agency simply engaging in self-serving self-deception would 
not also manage to fool its director-monitors.  Procedures to 
guard against conflicts have the same types of shortcomings.  
The thoroughly corrupt agency simply lies, and the self-deceiving 
agency simply convinces itself all is well.  The essential conflict, 
that the issuer is the client, remains, no matter what formal 
separations of duties and outside monitoring is mandated. 
What is needed in the moderate term is vigorous 
competition.  But in the short term, competition has proven a 
disaster.  Why?  Because the Big Three have “issuer pays” as 
their business model.  Their incentives have been to direct their 
efforts (and for those who were actually corrupt, their guile) at 
“accommodating” their clients, working with their clients to 
achieve the desired ratings.  If the agencies were simply and 
straightforwardly corrupt, they might be dissuaded from this 
course of action by sufficient monitoring and accountability.76  In 
the likelier scenario, in which self-deception plays a significant 
part, the agencies are going through the motions, guided by their 
highly-paid counselors, and do not really know they are 
sanitizing ultimately suspect and self-serving conclusions. 
The solution is to get away from an “issuer pays” model, in 
which those paying for ratings are the securities’ sellers, and 
return to “subscriber pays,” in which ratings are paid for by 
people buying research as to securities’ quality77  But how?  
When an issuer is issuing securities, how can a “subscriber pays” 
rating be arranged?  When the legislation that would become the 
Dodd-Frank Act was being considered in the Senate, Al Franken 
proposed an amendment that would have achieved some of the 
benefits of “subscriber pays” consistent with an “issuer pays” 
model in the context of ratings that have been particularly 
catastrophic, those of structured finance securities such as 
 
 75 Claire A. Hill & Erin A. O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1717, 1781–88 (2006).  Given the enormous difficulty, if not near-impossibility, of 
measuring independent-mindedness, the formal definitions are used as proxies.  But 
there is ample reason to suppose they are not very good proxies. 
 76 Or maybe not.  Maybe, as suggested above, they would simply direct their efforts 
at concealment. 
 77 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at n.32 & n.33 and accompanying text. 
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subprime securities.78  The amendment was adopted by the 
Senate, but dropped in the committee reconciliations of Dodd-
Frank.79  Franken’s amendment would have required the 
creation of a board that would select the rating agency to be used 
to rate a structured finance issuance.80  The issuer would not be 
able to “fire” the agency and select another.81  It could use a 
second agency as well, but it would have to contend with the first 
agency’s rating. 
One important reason agencies are not presently competing 
vigorously on quality is that market norms dictating the use of 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch are sticky.  One way to 
achieve more vigorous competition is by giving Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch viable competitors—competitors 
the markets will accept.  The government had a real chance in 
this area.  Through the Franken amendment’s board, it could 
have given other agencies more visibility and acceptance in the 
marketplace by requiring issuers to use them.  This probably 
would not have led to the most vigorous possible competition on 
quality, however, as there is no reason to suppose the board 
would have been expert at, or even inclined to, seek the “best” 
agency.  But the board could and would have set minimum 
standards of competence.  The increment of quality beyond that 
minimum increment is less important than attenuating the tie 
between issuers and rating agencies, as the bill would have done.  
The board contemplated by the Franken amendment may yet 
come into existence, giving us a chance to test its usefulness: 
Dodd-Frank requires a study into the feasibility of such a board 
or a like mechanism.82 
There are other optimistic scenarios, some more likely than 
others.  Investors might be chastened by their experiences in the 
present financial crisis and become more wary of rating agency 
ratings, a prospect I consider quite unlikely given that even 
egregious misratings have not stopped market participants from 
listening to the rating agencies (recall the New York Times 
article discussed above, In Rating Agencies We Still Trust).83  The 
references in the statutes and regulations to rating agency 
 
 78 See Daniel Indiviglio, Franken Amendment Would Bring Real Rating Agency 
Reform, THE ATLANTIC (May 6, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/ 
05/franken-amendment-would-bring-real-rating-agency-reform/56346/. 
 79 See Michael Hirsh, Al Franken Gets Serious, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 2010, at 38, 40, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/05/al-franken-gets-serious.html. 
 80 Indiviglio, supra note 78. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010). 
 83 Gillen, supra note 65, at B1. 
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ratings might be replaced with references to far more accurate 
measures of creditworthiness (also very unlikely-after all, if such 
measures could readily be developed, they would have been 
developed and in use already, certainly by market participants if 
not in regulations).  One scenario, perhaps more likely than 
these, is that other agencies, such as Egan-Jones and now Kroll 
(the agency that bought one of the post-Enron designated rating 
agencies, LACE Financial, which is run by a well-known 
“corporate sleuth”) might, through aggressive positioning and 
perhaps good track records, manage to erode the market norm of 
using Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch.84  Egan-Jones and, 
for some of its ratings, Kroll, are using a different business model 
from that used by the Big Three, where the subscribers pay 
rather than the issuers.85  And for Kroll, even where the issuer is 
paying, Kroll is effectively touting its critical-mindedness and 
ability to ferret out fraud—something Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Fitch stated was not their strength when trying to 
explain and excuse their ratings of Enron.86  These are among 
the optimistic scenarios.  The pessimistic scenario is that history, 
in the form of short investor memories and sticky market norms, 
repeats itself yet again.  Dodd-Frank, as enacted, does not do 
enough to prevent this from occurring. 
 
 
 84 See Lucchetti  & Neumann, supra note 54, at C1; see  James Freeman, 
Editorial, Where There’s Corruption, There’s Opportunity, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4–5, 2010, 
Weekend Ed., at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704476104575439841537558182.html#. 
 85 Freeman, supra note 84, at C1; NRSRO—Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Agency, EGAN-JONES, http://www.egan-jones.com/nsrso (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
 86 See, e.g., Enron Hearings, supra note 1, at 25.  Ronald Barone, a Managing 
Director of Standard & Poor’s, explained that Enron “was not a ratings problem.  It was a 
fraud problem.” Id. 
